Saturday, January 11, 2014

Fighting in Syria: A One-Way Trip?

After Saudi Arabia announced on November 2 a plan to spend millions on training Syrian Salafist rebel organizations with the help of Pakistan, many observers made the obvious comparison with Saudi Arabia train and bankroll the mujahedin in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion. The irony is compounded by the fact that Saudi Arabia’s support well counter Al Qaeda’s growing strength in Syria. Recent reports suggest that Saudi Arabia is concerned about one aspect history repeating itself: returning jihadis destabilizing Saudi Arabia’s security.
One major difference in Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Afghanistan and Syrian conflicts is the lack of a large-scale recruiting effort. Islamic charities and figures close to the Saudi government recruited extensively for the in Afghanistan jihad, so that participation in the jihad became a cultural phenomenon. Now, Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti has ordered Saudis not to go to Syria. He insists that Syria’s well-wishers should pray instead of sending fighters. The Saudi government has also discouraged fundraising and other grassroots efforts on behalf of Syria by Saudi Arabia’s Islamic charities. While Saudi Arabia considers Syria an important front on its Cold War with Iran, they want to prevent it from becoming the popular jihad that Afghanistan was.
Despite the lack of overt recruiting, a few reports suggest that the Saudi Arabian government is recruiting by other means. The Assyrian News Agency reported that Saudi Arabia sent as many as 12,000 death row prisoners, including foreign citizens, to fight in Syria. A leaked memo, allegedly from an Interior Ministry official, explained that “they will be exempted from the death sentence and given a monthly salary to their families and loved ones.” Another source of recruits for Syria are Saudis who feel persecuted in Saudi Arabia. Reema al-Jourish, wife of imprisoned activist Abdullah al-Hamili, announced on Twitter that his 16-year-old son Moath had arrived in Syria to fight for the rebels. She explained: “My son has been harassed within [Saudi Arabia] for supporting prisoners. I would not let him be taken easily by the tyrants. The land of dignity and glory is more merciful for him.” Apparently, al-Jourish decided to send her son to Syria after she received a call from the Interior Ministry threatening him. It is unclear whether the Interior Ministry intended to force Moath al-Hamili to go to Syria, but this incident illustrates the differences between the recruiting effort for Syria and therefore Afghanistan. Similarly, Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist for the Al Hayat newspaper cited the YouTube video of a conversation with Saudi citizens fighting it Syria. These fighters claimed they feared being killed if they return to Saudi Arabia after fighting in Syria.

Many analysts question the wisdom of Saudi Arabia’s decision to train Syria’s rebels, but it is clear that Saudi Arabia has learned one lesson from Afghanistan and is trying to minimize the chances of a second wave of returning jihadis: ensuring that only criminals and social outcasts volunteer for Syria, and that few if any return.

Mapping Syria’s Next Battleground: An Analysis of Media Coverage of Fears of the Spread of the Syrian Conflict to Lebanon


THESIS: As violence from Syria spills across the border into Lebanon, commentators in the Lebanese media described the country as being on the brink of conflict, and considered that the unrest in Syria was exposing Lebanon‘s political divisions and the weaknesses of its government. Both sides of the political spectrum also take the opportunity to blame their political opponents for Lebanon’s increasing involvement in Syria’s violence.

BACKGROUND: This analysis focuses on coverage from five major Lebanese news outlets with various ideological viewpoints. As Habib Battah, Managing Editor of the Beirut-based Middle East Broadcasters Journal has said "Every Lebanese TV channel has a propaganda leaning. Some try to be balanced, but all have their agendas. It's pretty clear from the content they produce."[1] Al-Manar is Hezbollah’s official television station, which also publishes articles online. Widely considered to be biased in favor of extremist violence, it has been designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, and it has been blocked in several European countries. Annahar is Lebanon’s most widely read daily newspaper, with a circulation of about 40,000[2]. It is not formally affiliated with any political party, but it expresses anti-Hezbollah and anti-Assad opinions[3] . Assafir is the second most widely-read newspaper. While  it is not affliated with Hezbollah it generally  supports the policy of ‘Islamic resistance’3 The English-language Daily Star , founded to serve Lebanon’s expatriate community,  is prolific and generally considered unbiased on Lebanon’s domestic affairs[4]. Another English-language source, Ya Libnan, was originally intended to chronicle the events surrounding assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and it maintains pro-reform, anti-Hezbollah stance[5].

OBSERVED: One of the principal actors in Lebanon’s relationship with Syria is Hezbollah, which has a significant place in Lebanon’s government.  Many of the reports highlight Syria's long-term patronage of Hezbollah, and consider it likely that Hezbollah would fight for the Assad regime.  Several different writers accused Hezbollah of confusing Syria’s interests with the interests of Lebanon.  An opinion columnist for Ya Libnan said that by supporting Syria, Hezbollah is jeopardizing its transition from an armed militia into a mainstream civilian authority[6].  He emphasized that disarmament would be a necessary element of Hezbollah's progress, but that involvement in the Syrian conflict would cause Hezbollah to become more militant. If Hezbollah becomes involved in the unrest in Syria, it would be able use this to justify retaining its arms, just as it used the Israeli presence in South Lebanon as a reason to arm.   Furthermore, since the Syrian opposition has popular support in Lebanon, acting against them might cost Hezbollah the popular support it has gained in the past decades as Lebanon’s champion against Israel.  

Some reports indicated that Hezbollah may have already made its choice about involvement in Syria. An ally of Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah quoted him as saying that they will support Syria's government in the event of foreign military intervention[7], and the Free Syria Army said that Hezbollah is already fighting on behalf of Syria’s government. 

Reports in Ya Libnan[8] and The Daily Star[9] noted that Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati seemed to be distancing himself from Syria, particularly by attending a meeting held by Syria’s regional rival Saudi Arabia, as well as visiting Syria's estranged neighbor Turkey.  Several observers suggested that Syria’s current preoccupation makes this a perfect moment for Lebanon to break free of the influence of the Assad regime.  A writer for the Daily Star said that if Lebanon can get its political house in order now, it can resist future Syrian interference.  However, many media outlets blamed Lebanon’s governmental disorganization for allowing Assad forces to cross the border with impunity and kidnap Lebanese citizens.
Another Daily Star[10] column pointed out that in most countries one such incident would be considered an act of war, but it has happened in Lebanon repeatedly and the Lebanese government has done little about it. The author also expressed outrage about the lack any government response to the networks of spies that have been discovered in the country.

While the majority of the coverage revolved around the relationship between Lebanon and the Assad regime, reports also expressed concern about the presence of opposition forces in the country, particularly in the town of Wadi Khalid.  Moreover, Al Manar [11]reported that groups of fighters are traveling as far as Beirut to recover from the fighting and gather supplies.  The same report described the large amount of popular support that these rebels have in Syria. 

Assafir[12] worried that Wadi Khalid will become merely a weapons depot for the Syrian resistance and will end up outside of Lebanese control. The writer added that the Lebanese involved in cross-border counter- abductions were associated with the opposition March 14 movement. A few editorial writers also speculated that the presence of the Sunni Free Syria Army in the region will stir up the sectarian tensions, which have already been evident in the clashes in Tripoli, and reawaken Lebanon’s internal religious conflicts.

ASSESSMENT:  Political observers are concerned that Hezbollah's alignment with the Assad regime will derail their transition from an armed militia to a mainstream political party, and then a struggle between Hezbollah and the other elements of the government  that have been distancing themselves from Syria will destabilize the fragile government further.  Syria's interference in Lebanese affairs is obviously resented, but none of the observers seem to believe that its possible for Lebanon to successfully distance itself from Syria and its crises.
There was considerable outrage over the Lebanese government's inability to protect its borders in response to kidnappings and cross border attacks, which are considered demonstrative of its weakness.  The government was also criticized for allowing the Free Syria Army to use Wadi Khalid as a de facto base and weapons depot, particularly as it may become a target for retaliation by Syria’s government. 

Furthermore, although there seemed to be sympathy for the Syrian opposition, many writers worried what the presence of armed foreign fighters will do to stability, and that the conflict between those in the north who support the opposition and those who oppose it will deepen the already existing divides in the volatile region. Also, the armed groups from both sides that apparently travel freely through Lebanon demonstrate the country’s security problems.

Most of the opinion columnists emphasized the role that their political opponents are playing in dragging Lebanon into the Syrian crises.  Opposition papers decried Syria’s long-term interference in Lebanese affairs, and warned of the consequences of Hezbollah’s close relationship with the Assad government. They implied that Hezbollah’s leadership values the interests of Syria more highly than those of Lebanon. Conversely, the pro-Hezbollah media outlets suggested that their opponents’ sympathy for Syria’s opposition movement gives the Free Syria Army a dangerous foothold within Lebanon itself. Both sides of Lebanon’s political debate clearly wish to distance themselves from responsibility for the spread of violence, while implicating the opposition.

Overall, there was a sense that Lebanon’s slide into the morass of the Syrian conflict was inevitable, that Hezbollah will continue to act as a Syrian proxy, that the central government will remain ineffective, and that Lebanon, from Wadi Khalid to Beirut, will become another battleground for the conflict.

REFERENCES:
“Hezbollah on Syrian Quicksand.” Ya Libnan 29 June 2012. http://www.yalibnan.com/2012/06/29/hezbollah-on-syrian-quicksand/
Analysis: A turning point in Lebanon Ya Libnan 5 June 2012. http://www.yalibnan.com/2012/06/05/analysis-a-turning-point-in-lebanon/
“Hula massacre and  the exploitation of the ambiguity surrounding the Syrian-Lebanese Border” Al Manar 6 July 2012 http://www1.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?fromval=2&cid=171&frid=31&seccatid=171&eid=249869
“Beirut ... A safe city to for Syrian opposition fighters “ Al Manar 3 July 2012. http://www1.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?fromval=2&cid=171&frid=31&seccatid=171&eid=265429
“Iran, Hezbollah to defend Syria from 'attack': militant.” The Daily Star. 3 July 2012 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Jul-03/179209-iran-hezbollah-to-defend-syria-from-attack-militant.ashx#axzz20PSfHwk1
“Lebanon and the Expected Explosion”   Annahar 5 July 2012 http://www.annahar.com/article.php?t=makalat&p=14&d=24781&dt=2012-07-05%2000:00:00
The Strategy Needed to Protect Domestic Security so that the Fire Does not Spread to Lebanon” Annahar 6 July 2012. http://www.annahar.com/article.php?t=makalat&p=5&d=24781&dt=2012-07-06%2000:00:00
The Security of Hezbollah and the Security of Lebanon .Annahar. 11 July 2012. http://www.annahar.com/article.php?t=makalat&p=23&d=24786&dt=2012-07-11%2000:00:00
“Chaos Reigns In North Lebanon, Where Military has Lost Control.” Assafir 14 June 2012 http://assafir.com/MulhakArticle.aspx?EditionId=2198&MulhakArticleId=503954&MulhakId=3922


[1] Paul, Cochrane. "Are Lebanon's Media Fanning the Flames of Sectarianism?" Arab Media and Society Summer 2 (2007)
[3] Trombetta, Lorenzo. "Media Landscape - Lebanon - European Journalism Centre." European Journalism Centre. European Journalism Centre, 8 Nov. 2010.
[4] About US." The Daily Star. Web. . http://www.dailystar.com.lb/AboutUs.aspx
[5] “About Ya Libnan”  Ya Libnan. http://yalibnan.com/site/about.php
[6] “Hezbollah on Syrian Quicksand.” Ya Libnan 29 June 2012. http://www.yalibnan.com/2012/06/29/hezbollah-on-syrian-quicksand/
[7] “Iran, Hezbollah to defend Syria from 'attack': militant.” The Daily Star. 3 July 2012 http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Jul-03/179209-iran-hezbollah-to-defend-syria-from-attack-militant.ashx#axzz20PSfHwk1
[8] Analysis: A turning point in Lebanon Ya Libnan 5 June 2012. http://www.yalibnan.com/2012/06/05/analysis-a-turning-point-in-lebanon/
[11] “Beirut ... A safe city to for Syrian opposition fighters “ Al Manar 3 July 2012. http://www1.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?fromval=2&cid=171&frid=31&seccatid=171&eid=265429
[12] “Chaos Reigns In North Lebanon, Where Military has Lost Control.” Assafir 14 June 2012 http://assafir.com/MulhakArticle.aspx?EditionId=2198&MulhakArticleId=503954&MulhakId=3922